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Frances T. v. Village Green Owners
Association: Liability of Condominium
Associations and Boards of Directors for
Criminal Acts of Third Persons
In Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Association,' the owner of
a condominium unit sued the condominium association 2 and the
individual members of the board of directors of the association after
being raped and robbed inside her own unit.' The plaintiff alleged
negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.4 She
contended that the failure of the association to install sufficient
exterior lighting, and the refusal of the association to permit her to
install additional lighting outside her unit was the cause of her
injuries.- The California Supreme Court dismissed her causes of
action for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract,6 but
remanded the negligence claim for trial.7
Part I of this note will discuss the legal background of Frances
T.1 Part II sets forth the facts and decision of the case. Part III will
examine the legal ramifications of the opinion.
1. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986).
2. The condominium association was a non-profit corporation. Id. at 496, 723 P.2d at
574, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 457. Homeowners associations may be either incorporated or unincor-
porated. An incorporated homeowners association is incorporated and governed under the
Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporation Law. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 7110-8910 (West 1977
& Supp. 1987). 11 D. HAGMAN & R. MAXWELL, CALFnORNIA REAL EsTATE LAW AND PRACTiCE
§ 385.03 (1986) [hereinafter D. HAGmAN & R. MAXWELL].
3. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 495-96, 723 P.2d at 574, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 496-98, 723 P.2d at 574-76, 229 Cal. Rptr. 457-59.
6. The breach of the contract claim was dismissed on the grounds that the conditions,
covenants, and restrictions, and the bylaws were incorporated in the contract, recorded in the
grant deed for plaintiff's condominium, and no provisions were in the writing which imposed
any contractual obligation on the defendants to install additional lighting. Id. at 512-13, 723
P.2d at 586-87, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 469. The breach of fiduciary duty claim was also dismissed.
The court stated that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation to exercise due
care and to maintain undivided loyalty to the corporation. A fiduciary duty does not normally
arise between landlords and tenants, and the plaintiff alleged no facts showing the directors
had a duty to serve as the Village Green Association's landlords. Id. at 513, 723 P.2d at 587,
229 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
7. Id. at 514, 723 P.2d at 587, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
8. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986).
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Landlord Liability
Under the edrly common law when a property owner leased to a
tenant, the lessor surrendered both possession and control of the
land to the lessee and merely retained a reversionary interest in the
premises. 9 The lessee acquired a present possessory estate in the land
during the term of the lease, with the attendant responsibilities of
maintaining the premises and correcting dangerous conditions which
developed while the tenant was in possession.10 The landlord's re-
sponsibilities, therefore, were transferred to the lessee and the land-
lord had no duty to safeguard the physical security of tenants."
Distinct exceptions to this general rule of nonliability have evolved
when a "special relationship" exists. 2 These exceptions prompted
the creation of a special relationship between landlords of urban
9. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON Tim LAW OF TORTS 434 (W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
10. Id.
11. R. ScHosmNsKi, AMmRCAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 4:14 (1980). This rule
continues in recent cases in some circumstances. See Powell v. United Oil Corp., 160 Ga.
App. 810, 287 S.E.2d 667 (1982) (lessor of service station not liable for emotional distress of
plaintiff when third person watched her using restroom facilities through peep hole); Seago v.
Roy, 97 Ill. App. 3d 6, 424 N.E.2d 640 (1981) (even though landlords made minor repairs,
landlords had no duty to keep safe premises under tenant's control); Moore v. Muntzel, 231
Kan. 46, 642 P.2d 957 (1982) (lessor retained no control over premises for determination of
liability for fire damage).
12. R. ScHosHSNsis, supra note 11, § 4:14. Certain relationships are protective by nature
and give rise to an affirmative duty to render aid. Id. A "special relationship" exists between
common carriers and passengers. See, e.g., McPherson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 383 F.2d
527 (5th Cir. 1967); Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959)
(liability for physical attacks); Robinson v. Southern Ry. Co., 40 U.S. 549 (1913); Pullman
Palace-Car Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921 (1898) (liability for thefts of property).
The courts have also deemed the relationship between innkeepers and guests to be "special."
See, e.g., Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, 5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 125 N.E.2d 544 (1955); McFadden
v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 56, 46 N.E.2d 573 (1943); Jenness v. Sheraton-Cadillac
Properties, Inc., 48 Mich. App. 723, 211 N.W.2d 106 (1973) (hotel guest was struck with tire
iron by a woman the manager earlier suspected of loitering in the lobby to turn a trick). A
special relationship is also present between employers and employees. See, e.g., Walker v.
Rowe, 535 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. II. 1982); David v. Missouri P. Ry., 328 Mo. 437, 41 S.W.2d
179 (1931). The relationship between jailers and prisoners is also special. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 42 P.2d 235 (1935); Breaux v. State, 326 So. 2d 481 (La. 1976).
Hospital-patient relationship is also considered special. See, e.g., Sylvester v. Northwestern
Hosp., 236 Minn. 384, 53 N.W.2d 17 (1952). The relationship is also "special" between
schools and pupils. See, e.g., Schultz v. Gould Academy, 332 A.2d 368 (Me. 1975); Brahatcek
v. Millard School Dist., 202 Neb. 86, 273 N.W.2d 680 (1979). A special relationship also exists
between business establishments and customers. See, e.g., Winn-DLxie Stores, Inc. v. Johnsto-
neaux, 395 S.2d 599 (Fla. App. 1981).
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dwellings and their tenants.13 The landlord-tenant exception departed
from the early common law rule that the landlord was not required
to take measures to protect the tenant from criminal acts of third
persons absent the imposition of a duty by contract or statute. 14 The
development of an exception to the common law rule was founded
on the traditional innkeeper-guest exception under which a duty was
imposed upon innkeepers to protect their guests.'5 The rationale of
this rule was that patrons, and hence tenants, had limited ability to
take measures for their own protection in situations where the lan-
dlord controlled the premises. 16 Since the conditions of modern day
urban leasing bear little resemblance to the early common law setting,
the law shifted to favor tenants with the right to expect protection
from their landlords in certain situations. 17
Perhaps the most problematic issue in those cases where a tenant
has been injured by the criminal act of a third person is that of
causation. 8 Both courts and commentators have debated whether to
treat the landlord's failure to take protective measures as the proxi-
mate cause of the tenant's injury, 9 or to consider the third party's
13. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 11, at 216; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 383. A
special relationship did not arise in the agrarian setting of the early common law because the
tenant was generally in total control of leased property and the ability of tenants to provide
for their own protection was unimpaired. Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs
of Crime?, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 299, 309 (1981).
14. R. ScHOSi mNsK, supra note 11, at 216. See Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark,
38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962) (court followed traditional view and found no duty by
landlord to protect others from criminal acts). The Restatement (Second) of Property section
17.3 is contrary to the traditional rule:
A landlord who leases a part of his property and retains in his own control any
other part the tenant is entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to him, is
subject to liability to his tenant and others lawfully upon the leased property with
the consent of the tenant or a subtenant for physical harm caused by a dangerous
condition upon that part of the leased property retained in the landlord's control,
if the landlord by the exercise of reasonable care could have: (1) discovered the
condition and the unreasonable risk involved therein; and (2) made the condition
safe.
RESTATEMENT (SEcom) OF PROPERTY § 17.3 (1952). Comment 1 to section 17.3 adds that the
unreasonable risk of harm from criminal intrusion constitutes a dangerous condition. Further-
more, if the landlord could have discovered the unreasonable risk of criminal intrusion by the
exercise of reasonable care, the landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused by
such intrusion if the landlord failed to take necessary precautions. Id. at Comment 1.
15. R. ScHosBms.IS, supra note 11, at 216.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 216-18.
18. Haines, supra note 13, at 309. See Goldberg, 38 N.J. at 590, 186 A.2d at 297 (the
issue of causation is uncertain and nearly indeterminable because of the extraordinary specu-
lation inherent in deterring criminal ventures of third persons).
19. Haines, supra note 13, at 310. See Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 47 A.D. 2d
134, 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239, 244 (1975) (proximate cause represents a policy decision by which
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intervening criminal act as a superseding cause. 20 The first divergence
from the common law nonliability of landlords for third party
criminal acts occurred in 1970 in the case of Kline v. 1500 Massa-
chusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. ,21 which declared that a landlord
has a duty to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts com-
mitted by third parties. 22 The court in Kline reasoned that a special
it is determined how far removed an effect may be from its cause in fact for the actor to be
held legally responsible).
20. Haines, supra note 13, at 310. See Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846, 847 (D.C.
Cir. 1926) (landlord not responsible for independent criminal acts of third parties); Kline v.
1500 Massachusetts Ave., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (1970) (an act of third person in committing
intentional tort traditionally viewed as a superseding cause); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial
Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 131, 695 P.2d 653, 662, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 365 (1985) (an injury due
to the criminal acts of a third person was of no consequence in the determination of liability).
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 448 provides that a third person's act in committing an
intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause unless the actor at the time of his negligent
conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created,
and that a third person might use the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965). Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302B provides: "An
act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person
which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal." Id. § 302B (1965).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 449 states that if the likelihood that a third person
may act in a particular manner is the hazard which makes the actor negligent, such an act
whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from
being liable for harm caused thereby. Id. § 449. Many courts have held that a third party
criminal act severs the chain of causation between the landlord's failure to protect and the
harm suffered by the tenant. Haines, supra note 13, at 310. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Kidwell,
12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (criminal act is superseding cause); Goldberg, 38 N.J. at 590,
186 A.2d at 297 (1962) ("It would be quite a guessing game to determine whether some
unknown thug of unknowable character and mentality would have been deterred if the owner
had furnished some or . . . additional policemen."). But c.f. Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S.
459 (1947) (foreseeable danger was irrelevant when employer knew of likelihood of danger of
possible criminal attack and duty imposed on employer to take precautions against possible
attack); Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1962) (intervening
forces will not break the causal connection if the intervention of the forces was itself probable
or foreseeable). Despite the general "no duty" rule, landlords at common law were liable for
third party criminal acts against their tenants if the landlords' direct act of negligence
precipitated the injury. Haines, supra note 13, at 311. Landlords were responsible for mis-
feasance, or active misconduct causing injury to their tenants, but not for nonfeasance, or
failure to take steps to protect the tenants from harm. Haines, supra note 15, at 311. The
court in Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
stated that the reason earlier courts failed to impose a duty of protection on landlords was
based upon several principles: (1) judicial reluctance to alter the traditional common law
concept of the landlord-tenant relationship by broadening the responsibilities of the landlord;
(2) the notion that the act of a third person in committing an intentional tort that harms
another person is a superseding cause of the harm; (3) the difficulty of determining foresecability
of criminal acts; (4) the undefined standard which the landlord must meet; (5) the economic
consequences of the imposition of the duty; and (6) the conflict between imposing a duty
upon landlords to protect tenants and the public policy that allocates the duty of protecting
citizens from criminal acts to the government rather than the private sector. Kline, 439 F.2d
at 481.
21. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
22. Id. at 478. The court in Kline found support from Levine v. Katz, 407 F.2d 303
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relationship exists between a landlord and a tenant giving rise to a
duty. 23 The court stressed that the modern landlord-tenant relation-
ship is more closely analogous to that of the innkeeper-guest rela-
tionship than to the agrarian antecedent where no duty was imposed,
because modern tenants have little control over the common areas
and can rarely provide for their own protection.24 The tenant, there-
fore, has the right to expect the landlord to provide reasonable
protection from foreseeable harm.2
The Kline decision has not precipitated the imposition upon lan-
dlords of a general duty to protect tenants from criminal activities.
A limited duty arises only where the foreseeability of harm to tenants
is present. 26 California courts have followed Kline in recognizing the
landlord's liability in certain situations. For example, in O'Hara v.
Western Seven Trees Corp.,27 the landlords had been notified that a
man had raped several tenants in their apartment complex. 28 The
landlords were also aware of conditions indicating a likelihood that
the rapist would repeat his attacks.29 The plaintiff had been assured
before leasing the premises that they were safe and were patrolled at
all times by professional guards. The plaintiff, relying on these
statements, rented the apartment and later found that the landlords
did not employ any guards. 30 The tenant was raped in her apartment
four months later.31 The O'Hara court, relying upon Kline, stated
that although the rape occurred in the tenant's apartment, the failure
of the landlord to take reasonable precautions to safeguard the
common areas could have contributed to the tenant's injuries and
the case was remanded for trial. 32 O'Hara established the precedent
that since only landlords are in a position to secure common areas,
they have a duty to protect against types of crimes of which they
(1968), which recognized that a landlord, who is the only party with the power to make repairs
in a multiple dwelling complex, has a duty to tenants to use ordinary care and diligence to
maintain the common areas in a safe condition. Kline, 439 F.2d at 480; Levine v. Katz, 407
F.2d 303, 304 (1968).
23. Kline, 439 F.2d at 482-83.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court in Kline stated that the value of the modern apartment lease includes
not only the right to interior space, but also adequate heat, light, ventilation, serviceable
plumbing, secure windows and doors, and proper maintenance. Id. at 481.
26. Id. See R. ScmosmNsms, supra note 11, at 217-23.
27. 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977).




32. Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
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have notice and which are likely to recur if the common areas are
not secure.
33
The rule of O'Hara was refined in 7735 Hollywood Boulevard
Venture v. Superior Court.3 The plaintiff in Hollywood was raped
by an individual who, because of his frequent attacks, had been
dubbed the "Westside Rapist" by the media.35 The plaintiff claimed
that the landlord was negligent for failing to replace a burned out
light bulb in the common area. 36 She alleged that because there were
incidents of rape in the neighborhood, the landlord should have been
on notice of the threat to her safety. 37 In dismissing the action, the
court emphasized that there were no prior acts of violence on the
premises and that the landlord could not therefore have had notice
of the danger. 38 In addition to the court's finding that the landlord
could not foresee the injury, the court found that requiring a landlord
to install and maintain lighting for security purposes was proble-
matic.39 The court stated that imposing a duty raises the difficult
problem of determining the areas in which lighting is required, and
the wattage of lighting which the landlord has a duty to install.40
A short time after the Hollywood decision, the California Court
of Appeal held in Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co.41 that a
landlord owed a duty to guard the safety of his tenants.4 2 The tenant
in Kwaitkowski was raped and robbed in a dimly lit lobby of an
apartment building. The front door to the complex had a defective
lock and some lights were missing.43 The factual situation in Kwait-
kowski was similar to that in Kline and in O'Hara because the
33. Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
34. 116 Cal. App. 3d 901, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1981).
35. Id. at 903, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. In defining the duty a landlord owes a tenant, the Hollywood court noted that
even though a proprietor is not the insurer of the safety of persons on the premises, when
foreseeable risks are present, the landlord is under a duty to control the acts of third persons
and to protect the tenants against the risk of harm. Where the landlord has no reason to
anticipate potential criminal attacks, however, the landlord is not required to take precautions
against such unforeseeable injury. Id. at 905, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
39. Id. at 906, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
40. Id. at 905, 172 Cal. Rptr. 530. The Hollywood court stated that, where no prior
crimes had occured on the premises, the question of duty owed is undefinable since "it is an
easy matter to know whether a stairway is defective and what repairs will put it in order ...
but how can one know what measures will protect against the thug, the narcotic addict, the
degenerate, the psychopath, and the psychotic?" Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38
N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962)).
41. 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 326, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
1988 / Recent Developments
landlords had actual notice of the danger to the tenants based on
the high crime rate in the neighborhood, and prior attacks and
robberies on the premises." The court stressed that the difference
between Hollywood and Kwaitkowski was that the assaults on other
tenants were both predictable and probable in Kwaitkowski, whereas
in Hollywood no prior attacks had occurred on the premises .4  The
Kwaitkowski court based the landlord's duty to the plaintiff on the
special relationship between the landlord and the tenant46 and the
foreseeability of the criminal attack.47 Thus, where the landlord has
actual knowledge of prior attacks, a duty arises to protect the tenant
from foreseeable harm by third persons.48
In 1984, the California Supreme Court extended landlord tort
liability for the criminal acts of a third party to a community college
in Peterson v. San Francisco Community College District.49 The
plaintiff in Peterson was assaulted on a stairway in a campus parking
lot when a man jumped from behind thick foliage adjoining the
stairway.50 The court found that a special relationship existed which
imposed a duty on the college to protect and warn the plaintiff
against the dangers.5 1 Since prior assaults of a similar nature had
occurred on the same stairway and the defendant knew of the
incidents, but failed to warn the tenant or trim the adjacent foliage,
the defendant was liable.5 2
Landlord liability has also been extended to encompass homeown-
er's associations. In White v. Cox, 53 the Court of Appeals for the
44. Id. at 333, 176 Cal. Rptr at 500.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 326, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 496. The landlord-tenant relationship is similar to that
between an innkeeper and guest and is a "special relationship." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984).
50. Id. at 805, 685 P.2d at 1195, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
51. Id. at 806, 685 P.2d at 1195, 205 Cal. Rptr.. at 844. As a general rule a person has
no duty to control the conduct of another and no duty to warn others who may be endangered
by such conduct. Commonly recognized special relations, however, impose a duty between
innkeepers and guests and possessors of land and members of the public who enter in response
to the landowner's invitation. Id.
52. Id. at 815, 685 P.2d at 1202, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 851. The failure of the defendant to
notify students of prior assaults or to trim foliage connected the defendant's conduct with the
plaintiff's injury. Id. The Peterson court defined the question of duty as:
a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself
.... But it should be recognized that "duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only
an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law
to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.
Id. at 805-06, 685 P.2d at 1196, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)).
53. 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971).
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Second District held that condominium owners could maintain an
action against their condominium association for negligently main-
taining a sprinkler in the common areas of the complex.5 4 A member
of the unincorporated association of condominium owners sued for
personal injuries suffered when the plaintiff tripped and fell over a
water sprinkler alleged to have been negligently maintained by the
association in the common area of the project.15 The court in White
stated that condominiums draw elements both from tenancy in com-
mon and from separate ownership.5 6 Condominium owners are there-
fore tenants in common of the common areas and the personal
property held by the management association, and they are owners
in fee of separate units.57 The White court found that condominiums
possess sufficient aspects of an unincorporated association to make
them liable in tort to their members. 8 Therefore, the liability of a
condominium association as a landlord had merely been extended to
include the negligent maintenance of the common areas.5 9
B. Director Liability
The primary reason for the creation of a corporation is the limited
liability afforded the shareholders for corporate obligations.6 0 Tort
liability of directors is rooted in the law of agency.6' Directors are
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 829, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 830, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
59. Id.
60. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 147 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
HENN & ALEXANDER]. Other corporate attributes include: (1) the power to take hold of and
convey property in the corporate name; (2) the power to sue and to be sued in the coporate
name; (3) centralization of management in the board of directors; (4) perpetual succession;
and (5) ready transferability of interests. Id.
61. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 352, 354 (1958). Section 352 provides:
An agent is not liable for harm to a person other than his principal because of
his failure adequately to perform his duties to his principal, physical harm results
from reliance upon performance of the duties by the agent, or unless the agent has
taken control of land or other tangible things.
Section 354 adds:
An agent who, by promise or otherwise, undertakes to act for his principal under
such circumstances that some action is necessary for the protection of the person or
tangible things of another, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm to
him or to his things caused by the reliance of the principal or of the other upon his
undertaking and his subsequent unexcused failure to act, if such failure creates an
unreasonable risk of harm to him and the agent should so realize.
In regards to nonfeasance, Restatement (Second) of Agency section 354, comment b provides
that "[t]he agent causes the damage by undertaking to afford protection and subsequently
failing to give it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 354, Comment b (1958).
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considered agents of their corporate principal for the purposes of
tort liability.6 2 Under both the early common law and the current
law, directors are not liable for the torts of the corporation merely
by virtue of their office. 63 Nevertheless, directors were liable for
injuries suffered by third persons because of their own torts, irre-
spective of whether they acted on behalf of the corporation or on
their own account. 64 Participation in the tort by the director may be
found by direct action of the director65 or by knowing approval or
ratification of unlawful acts.66 When directors personally direct or
approve their agent's tortious conduct, they become jointly liable
with the corporation and can be named personally as defendants.6 7
The rationale for this rule, as stated in O'Connell v. Union Drilling
Co.,63 is that a contrary rule would allow a director of a corporation
to escape liability by hiding behind the shield of his corporate
position. 69
In a later case, United States Liability Insurance Co. v. Haidinger-
Hayes, Inc.,70 the California Supreme Court reviewed an action
brought by an insurance company against a corporation and the
corporation's president for damages for negligence in computing the
premium rate for an insured.71 The court stated that directors or
62. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 60, at 583.
63. See O'Connell v. Union Drilling Co., 121 Cal. App. 302, 308-09, 8 P.2d 867, 870
(1932) (money paid by plaintiffs to corporation for securities which were void at inception
held recoverable from directors who actively participated).
64. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141 (1975) (corporate
director who voted for commission of tort is personally liable even though tortious act
committed in name of corporation); Preston-Thomas Constr., Inc. v. Central Leasing Corp.,
518 P.2d 1125 (Okla. App. 1974) (a corporate officer or director becomes personally liable
for wrongfully using trust funds if the officer or director receives funds, participates in the
wrongful distribution of funds or is ignorant of the wrongdoing and negligently fails to learn
of the conversion).
65. See Price v. Hibbs, 225 Cal. App. 2d 209, 222, 37 Cal. Rptr. 270, 278, (1964)
(corporate officials who act tortiously are liable to injured persons even though corporation
may also be liable and have a cause of action against officials); James v. Marinship Corp.,
25 Cal. 2d 721, 742-43, 155 P.2d 329, 341 (1944) (agent of corporation liable for his tortious
act of discrimination in violation of contract).
66. See, e.g., United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 463
P.2d 770, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970) (liability insurance company brought action against
corporation and corporation's president for negligence in computing premium rates for an
insured).
67. See Dwyer v. Lanan & Snow Lumber Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 838, 841, 297 P. 2d
490, 493 (1956) (plaintiff injured by cable owned by corporation brought suit against corpo-
ration, director and officer who had notice of the danger but failed to remedy the danger).
68. 121 Cal. App. 302, 8 P.2d 867 (1932).
69. Id. at 309, 8 P.2d at 870. See also 18B AM. JuR. 2d Corporations § 1877 (1964).
70. 1 Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d 770, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970).
71. Id.
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officers of a corporation only incur liability if they participate in the
wrong or direct that the tort be done. 72 In examining the type of
liability imposed upon agents for active participation in tortious acts,
the court noted that liability of officers and directors has mostly
been restricted to cases involving physical injury, not pecuniary harm,
to third persons.7 3 The court held the corporation liable, but not the
corporation's president, because no fiduciary relationship existed
between the president and the plaintiff. 74
Directors have also been found liable in situations similar to that
in Dwyer v. Lanan & Snow Lumber Co. 75 when the director knows
that a condition or instrumentality under his or her control poses an
unreasonable risk of injury to third parties, but fails to take action
to remove the risk of harm.76 In Dwyer, the manager of a sawmill
informed the defendant, who was both the president and a director
of the mill, that a cable had been secured improperly and was in
danger of falling. 77 The cable had fallen once before. The corporate
officials failed to secure the cable and were held liable to the person
injured when the cable fell. 78 The court held that the director was
liable for torts in which he had participated. 79
In a later case, Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co.,1° the California
Supreme Court applied the same rule of nonfeasance to misrepresen-
tation by a lender of mortgage terms.8' In Wyatt, the plaintiff was
induced to enter into a loan agreement which had been advertized
72. Id. at 595, 463 P.2d at 775, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 423 (1970). The court reasoned that
directors are not responsible to third persons for negligence amounting to nonfeasance, nor
are directors liable to third persons for a breach of duty owed to the corporation alone. Id.
In order for directors to be liable there must be a breach of duty owed to the third person
and the directors owed no duty to the plaintiff. Id.
73. Haidinger-Hayes, I Cal. 3d at 595, 463 P.2d at 775, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
74. Id. at 594, 463 P.2d at 774, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
75. 141 Cal. App. 2d 838, 297 P.2d 490 (1956).
76. Id. See Adams v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 107 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1958). In a
wrongful death action when an iron reel fell on the deceased, the corporate directors were
held liable because they should have foreseen the danger. Id. at 502. The court in Adams
noted that imposing liability in cases of nonfeasance depends on whether the director owes a
duty directly to a third person. No liability exists if the act consists only of a breach of duty
which the director owes to the corporation. Id. See also Curlee v. Donaldson, 233 S.W.2d
746 (Mo. App. 1950) (officer who instructed corporation to trespass and cut timber is liable
when act is done in the scope of employment); Schaefer v. D & J Produce Inc., 403 N.E.2d
1015 (Ohio App. 1978) (no liability of corporate officers when truck owned by corporation
and driven by corporate agent struck and killed another motorist).
77. Dwyer, 141 Cal. App. 2d 838, 839, 297 P.2d 490, 491 (1956).
78. Id. at 841, 297 P.2d at 493.
79. Id.
80. 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1979).
81. Id.
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by the defendant as having a small balloon payment at the end of
the loan term.8 2 At the end of the term, the balloon payment was
more than the original amount of the loan and the plaintiffs agreed
to refinance the amount with the defendant.83 The defendant then
assessed late charges and eventually threatened to foreclose on the
plaintiffs' home. The plaintiffs sued for misrepresentation of the
loan terms in the mortgage agreement.8 4 The court found that the
defendant had misrepresented the terms of the loan and held that
the directors were liable because they authorized and participated in
a conspiracy to injure third parties through the corporate entity.85
The Ninth Circuit has also faced the issue of director liability for
nonfeasance in Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants
Towboat Co. 8 6 In Murphy, the plaintiff sued the defendants under
the Sherman Act 87 for effectively excluding their tugboats from
servicing the large vessel segment of the ship assist market.88 In
dealing with the corporate executive's participation in attempting to
monopolize the industry, the court stated that personal liability must
be founded upon specific participation by the executive in the tort.89
The participation necessary for liability to ensue may be in the form
of direct action, or knowing approval or ratification of unlawful
acts.90 In addition, the court stressed that the acts or conduct must
be inherently unlawful before liability will attach.91 The court held
82. Id. at 779-80, 598 P.2d at 48, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (a balloon payment is amount
owed to amortize principal and interest unpaid at maturity of loan when monthly payments
are insufficient to cover full cost of loan).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 781, 598 P.2d at 49, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
85. Id. at 785, 598 P.2d at 52, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
86. 467 F. Supp. 841 (9th Cir. 1979). '
87. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1987).
88. Murphy, 467 F. Supp. at 847.
89. Id. at 852.
90. Id. The court cited several cases to support this proposition. See e.g. Donesco, Inc.
v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3rd Cir. 1978) (corporate officer arranged for the use and
copying of material constituting unfair competition); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (1975) (directors of the association promulgated and enforced white only
membership policy).
91. Murphy, 467 F. Supp. 841, 852 (9th Cir. 1979). The court relied upon Lobato v. Pay
Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1958), which stressed that the act must be
"positively wrongful" to generate individual liability to the participating directors or officers.
Lobato, 261 F.2d at 409. The Murphy court further noted that this principle is codified in
Section 2343 of the California Civil Code. Murphy, 467 F. Supp. at 852. California Civil
Code section 2343 provides:
AGENT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO THIRD PERSONS. One who assumes to act
as an agent is responsible to third persons as a principal for his acts in the course
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that the director's action, which was limited to approving or ratifying
the policy of refusing to work with competitors, was not inherently
wrongful and no liability could be imposed. 92
California courts have consistently held directors liable for wrong-
ful acts in which they participated or when they had knowledge of
a dangerous condition but failed to take precautions. 93 As an agent
of the corporation, directors are not liable for torts incurred by the
acts of the corporation as a whole unless the director was an actor
in the commission of the tort. 94
II. THE CASE
The question presented in Frances T. v. Village Green Owners
Association95 was whether a condominium owners association and
the individual members of the board of directors could be held liable
for injuries to a resident caused by the criminal conduct of a third
party. 96
A. The Facts
The plaintiff owned and lived in a condominium unit located in a
project consisting of ninety buildings with several large grassy areas
called courts. 97 The owners association was responsible for the man-
of his agency, in any of the following cases, and in no others:
1. When, with his consent, credit is given to him personally in a transaction; 2.
When he enters into a written contract in the name of his principal, without believing,
in good faith, that he has authority to do so; or, 3. When his acts are wrongful in
their nature.
CAL. CirV. CODE § 2343 (West 1985). However, the court stated that the often uncertain line
between proper and improper conduct, and the social interest in not deterring socially useful
conduct by the imposition of excessive risks makes appropriate a limitation on personal liability
in cases of participation by directors in inherently wrongful conduct. Murphy, 467 F. Supp.
at 853.
92. Id. at 853.
93. See Price v. Hibbs, 225 Cal. App. 2d 209, 222, 37 Cal. Rptr. 270, 278 (1964)
(corporate officials who act tortiously are liable to injured persons even though corporation
may also be liable); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 742-43, 155 P.2d 329, 341
(1944) (agent of corporation liable for his tortious act of discrimination in violation of
contract).
94. See, e.g., Murphy Tugboat v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat, 467 F. Supp. 841
(9th Cir. 1979); United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 463
P.2d 770, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 742-43, 155
P.2d 329, 341 (1944); Price v. Hibbs, 225 Cal. App. 2d 209, 222, 37 Cal. Rptr. 270, 278
(1964); Dwyer v. Lanan & Snow Lumber Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 838, 297 P.2d 490 (1956).
See also lB BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS (4th ed. 1985) § 101.
95. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986).
96. Id. at 495, 723 P.2d at 574, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
97. Id. at 496, 723 P.2d at 575, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
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agement of the project and the maintenance of common areas. 9 The
plaintiff's unit faced the largest court.9 9 The project had been subject
to a crime wave that included purse snatchings, burglaries, and
robberies. 10 All of the residents, as well as the members of the board
of directors, were aware of the criminal activity. 10' After the plain-
tiff's home was burglarized, she sought additional lighting because
the court upon which her unit faced was dimly lit.102 The plaintiff
formally requested that the condominium board of directors install
more lighting. 03 Some months later, when she had not heard from
the board, she made a second request.'0 4 The board of directors
failed to respond to the requests and the plaintiff subsequently
installed additional exterior lighting herself. 05 The board of directors
ordered her to remove the fixtures because the lighting violated the
project's covenants, conditions and restrictions.' °6 She refused to
comply. 07 Subsequently, she appeared before the board and requested
that her lights be allowed to remain until the lighting condition was
improved. 03 The board ordered her to remove the lights and prohib-
ited her from using them in the interim.' 9 The plaintiff complied
with the order and did not turn on her lights. 10 Since the lighting
she had installed was connected with the original circuitry, and since
she had removed the original lighting, the exterior of her unit was
in total darkness."' The evening she turned off the offending light
fixtures an intruder entered her unit and raped and robbed her." 2
The plaintiff sued the condominium association and the directors









106. Id. at 498, 723 P.2d at 576, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 459. Section 11.2(b) of the Conditions,
Covenants, and Restrictions provides: "Nothing shall be altered or constructed in or removed
from the Common Area or the Association Property, except upon the written consent of the
Board." Id. at 510 n.18, 723 P.2d at 584 n.18, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 467 n.18. (emphasis in
original).
107. Id. at 498, 723 P.2d at 576, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
108. Id.
109. Id. In response to complaints by residents, the board of directors, through the project's
Architectural Guidelines Committee, began to investigate possible lighting improvements in




113. Id. at 495, 723 P.2d at 574, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrers to plaintiff's three
causes of action without leave to amend and dismissed the case.' 4
The Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed the dismissal
of the contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims, but held that
the complaint stated a cause of action for negligence of the associ-
ation and the directors.115
B. The Opinion
The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision
allowing the plaintiff a cause of action for the negligence of the
homeowners association and the directors." 6 The court relied on
previous California decisions in concluding that the standard of care
owed by the association to potential victims of third party criminal
conduct is the same as that owed by a landlord." 7
The Frances T. court cited O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp."
which held a landlord has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect
a tenant from the criminal acts of third parties.'' 9 The Frances T.
court reasoned that since only landlords are in a position to secure
the common areas, they have a duty to protect tenants against types
of crimes of which the landlords have notice and which are likely to
recur if the common areas are not secure. 20 The Frances T. court
concluded that even though the association was not a landlord in
the strict sense, the fact that the common areas were solely within
the control of the association places the responsibilities of a landlord
upon the association.' 2' The court relied upon White v. Cox' -2 to
114. Id.
115. Frances Troy v. Village Green Condominium Project, 149 Cal. App. 3d 135, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1983) (appellate decision).
116. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986).
117. Frances T. v. Village Green, 42 Cal. 3d at 499, 723 P.2d at 576, 229 Cal. Rptr. at
459 (1986).
118. 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977).
119. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 501, 723 P.2d at 578, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 461. See supra
notes 27-33 and accompanying text for discussion of O'Hara. The court in Frances T. also
relied on Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 328, 176 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1981). See supra notes 41-48 for discussion of Kwaitkowski.
120. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 501, 723 P.2d at 578, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 461. The court in
Frances T. noted that foreseeability is the most important factor to consider when analyzing
the liability of the landlord. Foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances and
not by a rigid mechanical rule. Id. at 502, 723 P.2d at 579, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 462. The Frances
T. court also cited Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653,
24 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985) (evidence of prior similar incidents is not an indispensible requisite
or condition for a finding of foreseeability).
121. 42 Cal. 3d at 500, 723 P.2d at 578, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
122. 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971).
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hold the association liable for negligence since White held a condom-
inium association to the same standard of care owed by landlords.123
The court emphasized that the association bears the duty to protect
tenants from foreseeable crime. 24 The key to liability, according to
the court, is whether the association had knowledge that prior crimes
had been committed on the premises. 12 Even though the crimes
which occurred before the plaintiff's injury did not include rape, the
court stated that the precise injury to the plaintiff need not have
been foreseen so long as the possibility of this type of harm was
foreseeable.1 26
The Frances T. court then discussed the liability of the individual
directors.1 27 The court held that director liability for personal injuries
to a third party depends on a finding that the director specifically
authorized, directed, or participated in the allegedly tortious conduct,
or that the director knew of the hazardous condition and negligently
failed to take appropriate action to avoid the harm. 2' Under the
circumstances of the case, the court found the plaintiff had alleged
particularized facts that stated a cause of action for negligence against
the individual directors.129 The decision indicated that the directors
may have acted reasonably and that the plaintiff must prove that an
ordinary prudent person would not have acted similarly under the
123. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 500, 723 P.2d at 577, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 459. The court
also relied on O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427,
191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983). In O'Connor, the issue was whether a condominium association
that discriminated against children was a business establishment within the meaning of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act (CAL. CIV. CODE § 51). O'Connor, 33 Cal. 3d at 796, 662 P.2d at
431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324. The court in that case noted that the condominium association
performs all the customary business functions which rest on the landlord in the traditional
landlord-tenant relationship. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 503, 723 P.2d at 579, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 508, 723 P.2d at 584-85, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 466-67. The Frances T. court cited
several cases to support this proposition. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haveri Recreation Ass'n,
Inc., 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Eon Corp., 401 F. Supp. 729
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 124 Cal. App. 3d 558, 177 Cal. Rptr. 495
(1981); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1979); United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d 770,
83 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970); Price v. Hibbs, 225 Cal. App. 2d 209, 37 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1964);
Dwyer v. Lanan & Snow Lumber Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 838, 841, 297 P.2d 490 (1956);
Thomsen v. Culver City Motor Co., 4 Cal. App. 2d 639, 41 P.2d 597 (1935); O'Connell v.
Union Drilling & Petroleum Co., 121 Cal. App. 302, 8 P.2d 867 (1932). The plaintiff must
also prove that an ordinary prudent person would not have acted similarly under the circum-
stances. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 508, 723 P.2d at 584-85, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 466-67.
129. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 508, 723 P.2d at 584-85, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 466-67.
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circumstances.10 The court also noted that the causal link between
the lighting and the plaintiff's injuries could have been too atten-
uated. 3' These questions, the court held, were for the trier of fact
and were not appropriate grounds for sustaining a general demurrer
to the plaintiff's claim. 32
C. The Dissent
According to the dissent, neither the association nor the directors
should have been liable for negligence. 133 One contention of the
dissent is that the failure of the association to investigate the lighting
was characterized wrongly by the majority as misfeasance. 34 Mis-
feasance, according to the dissent, denotes conduct which is blame-
worthy in itself and the failure of the association to act promptly
was not blameworthy.135 The dissenters also rejected the majority's
finding that the association is under the same duty of care as a
landlord to protect tenants from the criminal acts of third persons.'36
They objected to the majority's reliance on O'Connor v. Village
Green Owners Association,3 7 in which a homeowners association was
construed to fill the role of a landlord under a statute which prevented
discrimination in all business establishments. 3 8 The dissent proposed
that the classification was irrelevant when deciding whether an as-
sociation is similar to a landlord for the purposes of the general
common law of torts. 39
The dissent further contended that California Corporations Code
Section 7231 was misconstrued by the majority and argued that the
130. Id. at 511-12, 723 P.2d at 586, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 519, 723 P.2d at 591, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. Chief Justice Bird, in her concurring opinion, found error in the dissent's reasoning.
She contended the distinguishing factor between misfeasance and nonfeasance is dependant
upon the participation of the defendant in the creation of the risk, not upon the blameworthiness
of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 515, 723 P.2d at 588, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (Bird, C.J.
concurring). According to Chief Justice Bird, in order for an act to consitute misfeasance, the
defendant's conduct need only increase the risk to the plaintiff and does not need to be
blameworthy in itself. Id. at 515, 723 P.2d at 588, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 695. The formula for
misfeasance and nonfeasance is capable of manipulation and any set of facts can be compressed
within the concept of nonfeasance or expanded to fit the mold of misfeasance. Harper &
Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
136. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 520, 723 P.2d at 592, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 475 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
137. 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1981).
138. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 500, 723 P.2d at 577, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
139. Id. at 520, 723 P.2d at 591, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 475 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
392
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Code altered the common law.'"4 The dissent argued that the Cali-
fornia Legislature, in enacting Section 7231, changed the common
law standard of care for directors by imposing one standard for all
situations.' 4 1 The proper standard, according to the dissent's inter-
pretation of Section 7231, should be one of subjective reasonable-
ness. 42 Therefore, the dissent would not apply the common law
which holds a director liable for injuries to a third party when the
corporation owes a duty of care to a third person. 43
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The effect of the decision in Frances T. may be to deter qualified
persons from becoming directors by subjecting them to increased
liability in tort.'" In the case of condominium associations, individ-
uals are disinclined to serve as directors because of the increased ex-
posure of their personal assets.'45 The added potential liability, as ex-
panded by Frances T., may further deter qualified individuals from serv-
ing since the risk is much greater than the rewards of being a director.',
140. Id.
141. Id. at 526, 723 P.2d at 598, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
142. Id. The California Corporations Code section 7231(a) outlines the duty of care a
director owes to a corporation:
A director shall perform the duties of a director, including duties as a member
of any committee of the board upon which the director may serve, in good faith,
in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and
with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would use under similar circumstances.
California Corporations Code section 7231(c) adds:
A person who performs the duties of a director in accordance with subdivision
(a) . . . shall have no liability based upon an alleged failure to discharge the person's
obligations as a director, including, without limiting, the generality of the foregoing,
any actions or omissions which exceed or defeat a public or charitable purpose to
which assets held by a corporation are dedicated.
The California standard relies upon the ABA Committee's comments where the committee
stated that the revised standard of care "reflects the good-faith concept embodied in the so-
called 'business judgment rule,' which has been viewed by the courts as a fundamental precept
for many decades ... [and] incorporates the familiar concept that .. . a director should not
be liable for an honest mistake of business judgment." ABA, Report of Committee on
Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501, 505
(1975). See also IB BAL .NT & STERLNG, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS (4th ed. 1985) §
406.01.
143. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 529, 723 P.2d at 598, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 481 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
144. J. HANNA, CALIFORNIA CoNDO umoruM HANDBOOK 115 (1975).
145. lB BALLNTIN & STERLINo, supra note 142, at § 406.08.
146. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 529, 723 P.2d at 598, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 481 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). See also, 1B BAL1rAiNE & STRuNo, supra note 145, at § 406.08. Any person
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The Frances T. decision may also cause increased insurance pre-
miums that are necessary to cover the added exposure of directors.
To assure directors that they may avoid the expense of liability in
situations similar to that in Frances T., corporations can indemnify
or insure them for expenses and damages that may arise from being
sued as a director. 147 With the parameters of liability increased by
Frances T., the costs of insurance for directors will proportionately
rise to meet the additional tort exposure. 148 Many insurance companies
have withdrawn from the directors and officers insurance market or
have altered their policies to decrease the availability and scope of
coverage, or have increased their premiums. 14 9 Since the condominium
association finances its operations by levying assessments on the
members, and because the cost of insurance is allowable as an
operating expense,5 0 the higher premiums will be passed on to the
individual owners. 51 Even though members of nonprofit corporations
considering serving as a director of a corporation is undoubtly concerned with potential
personal liability. Id. Controlling law provides some reassurance that a director may avoid
liability if the director performs the duties of a director and acts within the standards of
conduct set forth in the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law or the Nonprofit Mutual
Benefit Corporation Law. Both of these provisions require the director to perform his duties
in good faith and to act as an ordinary prudent person would in a like position under similar
circumstances. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5231(c), 7231(c) (West 1987). If a director acts according
to this standard, then no liability should attach for any alleged failure to perform obligations
as a director. IB BALLA"1n & STEiNuo, supra note 142, at § 406.08. It is apparent the
Frances T. decision invalidates the assurance of nonliability since the court found that the
failure of the directors to act amounted to participation in the tortious activity, thus subjecting
them to liability even though the directors were merely enforcing the Conditions, Covenants,
and Restrictions of the association. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 511, 723 P.2d at 586, 229 Cal.
Rptr. at 469.
147. lB BALLANTi'nE & STERLNG, supra note 142, at § 406.08. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317
(West 1977) (corporations can indemnify agents against judgments, fines, settlements, and
other amounts incurred in connection with a proceeding if the agent acted in good faith and
in the best interests of the corporation). See also id. §§ 5238(a), 7237(a) (West 1987) (directors
are agents entitled to indemnification if allowed by a majority vote of a quorum of directors
or upon approval of the members).
148. Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors With A Three Legged Stool
of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399, 400 (1987).
149. Id. Directors have reacted by refusing to serve because of increased potential liability.
The creation of an unreasonable risk of exposure of director's personal assets is undermining
the policy of having independent directors serve as decision makers. Id. at 401.
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1366(b)(1) (West 1987). The Department of Real Estate regulations
provides that regular assessments to defray expenses attributable to operation of homeowners
associations must ordinarily be levied against each owner according to the number of subdivision
interests owned by the individual assessed to the total number of interests subject to easements.
CAL. Aimw. CODE tit. 10, § 2792.16(a) (1987). See D. HAG?,AN & R. MAXWELL, supra note
2, at § 385.70.
151. D. HAGmAN & R. MAXWELL, supra note 2, at § 385.70. Owners cannot escape the
increase in expense because each unit owner is required to become a member of the homeowners
association and to pay monthly assessments. Id. at § 386.04.
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are not personally liable for the liabilities of the corporation, 52 if
insurance is unavailable and if the association agrees to indemnify
the director, the resulting expenses from lawsuits will be apportioned
among the association members. 15 3
Frances T. will also have an impact upon homeowners associations
and their ability to enforce architectural controls. 114 Directors of
homeowners associations are under a duty to exercise good faith in
approving or restricting new construction or improvements, and stand
in a fiduciary relationship with the association. -5 The court in Frances
T. recognized that a fiduciary duty exists between the directors and
the corporation, 15 6 and that homeowners may sue as shareholders for
damages resulting to the corporation. 57 The architectural controls,
which are included in the covenants and restrictions, are equitable
servitudes and bind all owners of separate interests in the project.'58
These servitudes may be enforced by any owner of a separate interest
as well as by the association. 1.9 Therefore, the homeowners may state
a cause of action based upon a breach of the architectural controls
against the association for approving construction which violates the
covenants, conditions, and restrictions and an injunction may issue. 60
Damages may also be recovered for a violation of a covenant.16' In
152. Id. at § 385.03.
153. Id. at § 385.70. Even though the board of directors is limited to regular assessment
increases of no more than 10% of the regular assessment from the preceding year, and special
assessments are limited to 5% of the budgeted gross receipts of the association for that year,
the assessment limitation does not apply to the increases in the payments of insurance premiums.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1366(b) (West 1987).
154. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 529, 723 P.2d at 598, 299 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
155. D. HAGMAN & R. MAXwELL, supra note 2, at § 385.74. See Cohen v. Kite Hill
Community Ass'n, 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1983) (homeowner stated a
cause of action against association for approving the construction of a neighbor's fence in
violation of the declaration of restrictions).
156. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 512, 723 P.2d at 587, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 470 (but no fiduciary
duty exists between directors and shareholders).
157. Id. The Frances T. court found no fiduciary duty existed between the directors and
the unit owner. Id.
158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354 (West 1987).
159. D. HAGMAN & R. MAxwELL, supra note 2, at § 385.74 (unless stated in the Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions).
160. Id. See Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972) (injunction
allowed for enforcement of a deed restriction limiting use to residential purposes in tract of
single family homes); Arrowhead Mut. Serv. Co. v. Faust, 260 Cal. App. 2d 567, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 325 (1968) (defendant's use of his lot for business purposes in violation of restrictions
was enjoined by suit based on equitable servitudes brought by other lot owners); Bramwell v.
Kuhle, 183 Cal. App. 2d 767, 6 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1960) (suit by owners of property to enjoin
construction in violation of subdivision restrictions).
161. D. HAGMAN & R. MAxWELL, supra note 2, at § 385.74. See Knox v. Streatfield, 79
Cal. App. 3d 565, 145 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1978) (action brought by condominium owner against
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light of these factors, the Frances T. decision places the directors in
a Catch-22 situation. In the case, the directors complied with the
association's covenants, conditions, and restrictions by mandating
removal of the lighting since their presence was in direct violation
of those regulations. The decision in Frances T., however, places the
directors in conflict with the association's guidelines since, by allow-
ing the plaintiff's lights to remain, the directors would breach the
fiduciary duty they owe to the corporation and could be subject to
damages if a shareholder brought suit.162
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court, in Frances T. v. Village Green
Owners Association, has extended landlord liability in tort for the
criminal acts of third parties to condominium homeowners associa-
tions. Not only did the court sustain a cause of action against the
association, but the court also held that the directors of the associ-
ation could be personally liable as well. The directors could be found
to have participated in a tortious act by their failure to respond
within a reasonable time to the plaintiff's request for adequate
lighting. The Frances T. decision may give rise to increased exposure
of directors for actions which actually amount to fulfillment of their
duties to the corporation through the enforcement of the covenants,
conditions, and restrictions of the homeowners association. The
liability of an association and the directors appears to turn on whether
the directors have knowledge of prior criminal acts on the premises
and of faulty conditions which exist in the security of the premises.
When such conditions exist, the directors are in a Catch-22 situation.
If the directors remedy the condition, they may be breaching their
fiduciary duties to the association by failing to enforce the associa-
tion's building restrictions. On the other hand, adhering to their duty
another owner for damages and injunctive relief for violations of subdivision building restric-
tions); Atlas Terminals, Inc. v. Sokol, 203 Cal. App. 2d 191, 21 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1962) (violation
of restrictive covenant to keep property clean and sightly gives rise to damages).
162. D. HAom" & R. MAxwELL, supra note 2, at § 385.74. See Raven's Cove Townhomes,
Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1981) (homeowners acted
as shareholders in suit for breach of fiduciary duty against developers who were directors of
association and caused damage to the corporation); Knox v. Streatfield, 79 Cal. App. 3d 565,
145 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1978) (plaintiffs action for damages was based upon a reduction of property
value for violations of the declaration of restrictions which amounted to the addition of a
storage shed, painting portions of the common areas, construction of a deck and building a
fence without approval of the architectural committee).
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to follow the association building resitrictions could result in injuries
to unit owners, which also results in liability.
Scott B. Hayward

